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Fascism reconsidered
(the map is not the territory)
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the new pantheon of fascism
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II. expanding the concept of fascism
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I. Fascism: state-of the art scholarship |
1. Patrimonialism, Fascism, and the Lynching for Rape Discourse
(Kant, Weber, Nietzsche, and Foucault)
fascism
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racism
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patrimonialism
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white supremacy
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racism
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white supremacy
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fascism
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patrimonialism
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patrimonialism
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fascism
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white supremacy
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racism
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white suspremacy
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patrimonialism
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racism
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fascism
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Aufhebung (from Wikipedia)
In Hegel, the term Aufhebung has the apparently
contradictory implications of both preserving and changing, and
eventually advancement (the German verb aufheben means "to cancel", "to
keep" and "to pick up"). The tension between these senses suits what
Hegel is trying to talk about. In sublation, a term or concept is both
preserved and changed through its dialectical interplay with another
term or concept. Sublation is the motor by which the dialectic
functions.
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READ THESE TWO LINKED TEXTS NOW
Excerpts from Eric D. Weitz, Weimar German: Promise and Tragedy (Princeton, 2007/2018), chapter 9, "Revolution and Counterrevolution from the Right" (pp. 331-360).
Eli Zaretsky, "The Mass Psychology of Trumpism" (London Review of Books, 18 September 2018).
David King, The Trial of Adolf Hitler: The Beer Hall Putsch and the Rise of Nazi Germany
(Norton, 2017) turns out to be an uncanny description of Trump's people
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The legitimation of violence against a demonized internal enemy
brings us close to the heart of fascism
Trump is "not hurting the people he needs to be hurting"
1. from It’s Just Too Much’: "A Florida Town Grapples With a Shutdown After a Hurricane, New York Times, 1-7-19.
I voted for
him, and he’s the one who’s doing this,” an employee of the Federal
prison in the Florida Panhandle said. “I thought he was going to do
good things. He’s not hurting the people he needs to be hurting.
2.
from Paxton's The Anatomy of Fascism
The legitimation of violence against a demonized internal enemy brings us close to the heart of fascism. p. 84
3. from Friedrich Nietzsche, The Geneology of Morals, II, 14
Here the
works of vengefulness and rancor swarm; here the air stinks of secrets
and concealment; . . . and what mendaciousness is employed to
disguise that this hatred is hatred! What a display of grand
words and postures, what an art of "honest" calumny.
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Kant on Concept Formation
from Eckart Förster, The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy: a Systematic Reconstruction (Harvard, 2012)
. . . concepts have their
basis in functions, by which Kant understands “the unity of the act of
bringing various representations under one common representaton.”
(A68). A concept is a rule for combining certain representations
(and thus also a principle for excluding certain others). Thus
the represesntations’white’, ‘grainy’, ‘saline’ are combined and
ordered in the concept ‘salt, while the representations ‘colorless’,
‘liquid’, ‘tasteless’ (say) are not. In this way a concept is a
rule allowing me to unite certain representations and to bring them
under a higher representation, i.e. the concept. (pp. 22-3)
Cognition does not consist merely in the collecting of phenomena;
rather we strive to forge conceptual links between them and to grasp
the laws of nature that are valid for specific classes of objects as
cases of yet more general laws, whereby we are guided by the ideal of a
unified explanation of nature. (p. 38)
“To make concepts out of representations one must be able to compare,
to reflect, and to abstract, for these three logical operations of the
understanding are the essential and universal conditions for the generation
of every concept whatsoever. I see, e.g., a spruce, a willow, and
a linden. By first comparing these objects with one another I
note that they are different from one another in regard to the trunk,
the btanches, the leaves, etc.; but next I reflect on that which they
have in common among themselves, trunk, branches, and leaves
themselves, and I abstract from the quantity, the figure, etc., of
these; thus I acquire a concept of a tree.” (pp. 250-51)
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Emden/Nietzsche on Language
dddd
from Christian J. Emden, Nietzsche on Language, Consciousness, and the Body (University of Illinois Press, 2005), p. 75
In Die fröliche
Wissenschaft (1882) Nietzsche proposes that language enables us to
“produce” things, to shape our conception of reality: “This has
given me the greatest trouble and still does: to realize that what
things are called is incomparably more important than what they are . .
. it is sufficient to create new names and estimations and
probabilities in order to create, in the long run, new ‘things’” (GS
58).
For Nietzsche, language lets us grasp, order, and judge what we regard
as reality, and it also gives us the means to reflect on this reality
through the development of general terms and concepts, which let us
realize similarities and relations among things and see contexts and
construct coherent systems of belief about this reality. Our
experience and knowledge of reality . . . is therefore embedded in a
network of concepts delineating what we perceive as our environment.
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A Concept of Fascism: There are five paragraphs, each one broken down into elements
Five paragraphs from Robert O. Paxton's The Anatomy of Fascism
(Alfred A. Knopf, 2004):
¶ 1. Fascism may be defined as a form
of political behavior marked by 1) obsessive preoccupation with community
decline, humiliation, or victimhood and 2) by compensatory cults of unity,
energy and purity, in which 3) a mass-based party of committed nationalist
militants, 4) working in uneasy but effective collaboration with
traditional elites (see Lind, Made in Texas), 5) abandons democratic liberties and 6) pursues with
redemptive violence and 7) without ethical or legal restraints 8) goals of
internal cleansing and 9) external expansion. p. 218
¶ 2.
The legitimation of violence against a demonized internal enemy brings us close to the heart of fascism. p. 84
¶ 3. The
United States itself has never been exempt from fascism. Indeed,
antidemocratic and xenophobic movements have flourished in America
since the Native American party of 1845 and the Know-Nothing Party
of the 1850s. In the crisis-ridden 1930s, as in other democracies,
derivative fascist movements were conspicuous in the United States.
The Protestant evangelist Gerald B. Winrod's openly pro-Hitler
Defenders of the Christian Faith with their Black Legion; William
Dudley Pelley's Silver Shirts (the initials "SS" were intentional) . .
. . Much more dangerious are movements that employ authentically
Amerian themes in ways that resemble fascism functionally. The Klan
revived in the 1920s, took on virulent anti-Semitism, and spread to
cities and the Middle West. In the 1930s, Father Charles E. Coughlin
gathered a radio audience estimated at forty million around an
anticommunist, anti-Wall Street, pro-soft money, and---after
1938--anti-Semitic message broadcast from his church in the ouskirts of
Detroit. For a moment in early 1936 it looked as if his Union Party
and its presidential candidate, North Dakota congressman William Lemke,
might overwhelm Roosevelt. . . . p. 201
¶ 4. It
may be that the earliest phenomenon that can be functionally related to
fascism is American: the Ku Klux Klan. . . . The first version of
the Klan in the defeated American South was arguably a remarkable
preview of the way fascist movements were to function in interwar
Europe. p. 49
¶ 5. Today [2004] a "politics of ressentment" rooted in authentic American piety
and nativism sometimes leads to violence against some of the very same
"internal enemies" once targeted by the Nazis, such as homosexuals and
defenders of abortion rights. . . . The languge and symbols of an
authentic American fascism would, of course, have little to do with the
original European models. They would have to be as familiar and
reassuring to loyal Americans as the language and symbols of the
original fascisms were familiar and reassuring to many Italians and
Germans, as Orwell suggested. . . . No swastikas in an American
fascism, but Stars and Stripes (or Stars and Bars) and Christian
crosses. No fascist salute, but mass recitations of the pledge of
allegiance [one minute and 45 seconds into this video].
These symbols contain no whiff of fascism in themselves, of course, but
an American fascism would transform them into obligatory litmus tests
for detecting the internal enemy. p. 202
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Roper on Q-Anon; Lachmann on patrimonialism
Lyndal Roper on Q-Anon: Lyndal Roper, Witch Craze: Terror and Fantasy in Baroque Germany (Yale, 2004):
The hatred and terror that drove people to such
violence were shaped by social tensions and religious beliefs, but the
passions themselves derived from deeply rooted fantasies, extravagent
in their evocation of demonic lovers and Satanic revels. These
fantasies shared, for the most part, a standard structure and a similar set of primary themes. p. 7
Richard Lachmann, "Coda: American Patrimonialism: The Return of the Repressed” in Patrimonial Power in the Modern World, Julia Adams and Mounira M. Charrad, eds. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2011:
Patrimonialism,
until fairly recently, seemed an archaic social form, largely replaced
by bureaucratic rationalism. That confident view of modernity, in the
histories that Max Weber and his followers wrote, deserves to be
challenged as patrimonial regimes reappear in states and firms
throughout the world.
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The above Concept of Fascism analyzed . . .
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There are five paragraphs, each one broken down into elements
Paragraph 2,
"The legitimation of violence against a demonized internal enemy"
perfectly encapsulates the "populist" performativity of
Trump's rallies.
Paragraph 1 is much more interesting.
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1 can be broken down into nine elements, six of which (1, 4, 5, 6, 7
and 8) characterize the Trump phenomenon.
1. obsessive preoccupation with community
decline
4. working in uneasy but effective collaboration with
traditional elites (see note on the concept of elites)
5. abandons democratic liberties
6. pursues with
redemptive violence
7. without ethical or legal restraints
8. goals of
internal cleansing
More interesting is to
look at the three elements of Paxton's definition of fascism that seem
least applicable: 2, 3 and 9.
2) cults of unity,
energy and purity
3) a mass-based party of committed nationalist
militants
9) external expansion
element
9 is violence + demonization: this is one of the laws of motion of
two-party politics. (the other law is bildung and the will to
power--New Deal). Subsumable under sado-sexual.
elements 2 and 3 are what is missing from the Trump-GOP
Paragraph 2
The legitimation of violence against a demonized internal enemy brings us close to the heart of fascism (violence and demonization)
Paragraph 3
In paragraph 3 Paxton provides a summary of the history of right-wing movements in the United States up 1936.
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5 describes the Trump campaign, even though the book was
published in 2004. This kind of conceptualization is absent
entirely from the two-party discursive field.
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Fascism Reconsidered: Fascism as Biocultural niche
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. . . and Deployed
Compare
Paxton's Paragraph 5 with the Lacan-Atwater Signifying Chain. Atwater
has shown how the discursive and symbolic elements of the
Southern Strategy were generated through the construction of a
theatrical arena in which hatred is expressed and sadism
performed.
This sado-sexual
performativity is the essence of the GOP's mass appeal. Well
before Trump the evocation of evil and the channelling of rage against
a scapegoat
(various forms of the other) was the stock-in-trade of Republican
politicians, from their Know-nothing ancestors [1850s] to today’s
fascist formations and modalities.
The rhetorical violence of
Trump
rallies, not ideology and policies, is what is fundamental. The Trump
performances--the audience, the cultural-historical context, and Trump
himself as a therapeutic object with which the audience member can
identify--become
intelligible when viewed through the prism of certain key concepts:
Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment; psychoanalysis's concept of the
mechanisms of defense; Wilbur Cash's concept of the proto-Dorian
convention; the Lacan-Atwater Signifying Chain; and Robert Paxton's
concept of redemptive violence.
On the right there are not issues, but postures, gestures,
various encodings of the same sado-sexual reflex (the inner logic of
racism). Rage enacted in a political-media theater of violence,
sadism, and revenge. The cruelty of it all is the most important thing. The
vicarious thrill, the “enthusiasm for inflicting pain, suffering,
or humiliation”(OED): this is what is seen at Trump rallies. The
GOP's performative cadre are specialists in herding raging hominids.
Here the works of vengefulness and rancor swarm; here the
air stinks of secrets and concealment; . . . and what mendaciousness
is employed to disguise that this hatred is hatred! What a display of
grand words and postures, what an art of "honest" calumny! (Nietzsche, The
Geneology of Morals, II,
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Randall Collins and Max Weber on Patrimonialism
Randall
Collins, "Patrimonial Alliances and Failures of State Penetration: A
Historical Dynamic of Crime, Corruption, Gangs, and Mafias,"The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 636, Patrimonial Power in the Modern World (July 2011), pp. 16-31
The historical shift
from patrimonialism to bureaucracy is the key organizational
transformation of the past thousand years. Classically, patrimonialism
was organization based on private households, plus alliances among
them. But there are two types of patrimonial organization: expanded
households and patrimonial alliances or pseudo-tribes. The latter
include ad hoc warrior coalitions, frequently organized as fictive kin.
The main historical cause of the shift from patrimonialism to
bureaucracy was the military-fiscal revolution and ensuing state
penetration into society. But patrimonial politics did not entirely
disappear. In some areas, the state fails to penetrate, leaving the
possibility of mafia-style organization. Elsewhere, political machines
are a mixed form of incomplete bureaucracy. Gangs are patrimonial
organizations, growing in dialectical conflict with bureaucratic
penetration and efforts at control. Through a comparison of American,
Sicilian, and Russian mafias, the questions considered are whether
crime organization recapitulates the history of the state, why some
gangs become bigger than others, and why organized crime succeeds or
fails in varying degrees.
Keywords: patrimonialism; modernity; bureaucracy;
state penetration; mafia; corruption; organized crime
Classically, patrimonialism
was organization based on private households, plus alliances among
them. Patrimonialism wields political power in the form of personal
loyalty and arbitrary discretion, tempered only by tradition. The
archetype of this kind of personal power is the family, but a
patrimonial household is not limited to kinship per se. What makes
patrimonialism capable of wielding large-scale power is that some
households expand beyond kinship and become extremely large by
including a large number of servants, armed guards, retainers,
hostages, and houseguests; the bigger the entourage of the head of such
a house, the greater his power.
It is important to distinguish, as Weber (1922/1968) did, between
patrimonialism and patriarchy. Rule by the father (literally) or male
dominance generally - patriarchy - can take place in many different
kinds of organization; it occurs even in bureaucracy, although
bureaucracy historically has been the main ally and organizational
weapon of resistance to patriarchy. Patrimonialism is something more.
Patrimonial power involves personal loyalty, but it is also
fraught with conflicts, betrayals, and treason—Shakespearean plots are
virtual textbooks of patrimonial politics. . . . patrimonialism and
bureaucracy are not bare organizational forms but sites for
constructing moral visions; proselytizers for expanding bureaucratic
state penetration are moral entrepreneurs as well as expanders of
organizational domains. The struggle between patrimonialism and
bureaucracy takes the form of rival moralities, althoug one side rarely
recognizes this about the organizational form they oppose.
And this, from Researchgate: What are patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism?
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n
Nazi Masculinity
from Ann Goldberg, “Women and Men: 1760-1960,” in Helmut Walser Smith, The Oxford Handbook of Modern German History (Oxford, 2011)
The alleged undermining of
the patriarchal family—the ruse of the ‘double earners’ (married women
performing paid labor outside the home), and sexually liberated New
Women—became a powerful symbol of the breakdown of the social fabric in
the chaotic years of the Weimar Republic, subject to intense poltical
debate, social policy interventions, and efforts to resurrect the
traditional gender order. The Nazis played directly on these
gender anxieties as they built their movement in the Weimar
years. Together with Jews and leftists, feminists and New Women
became symbols in Nazi propaganda of the decadence and weakness of
liberal democracy and modern urban life. Railing against the
‘soulless’ and ‘egotistical’ modern woman, National Socialists called
for their return to the home and for the restoration of the patriarchal
family—for, as the slogan went, ‘emancipation from emancipation’.
At the same time, the Nazis built upon the militarized masculinity and
culture of comradship that had evolved in WWI, glorifying the ideal of
a brotherhood of self-sacrificing soldier-comrades, and turning it into
an extreme cult of violence, hardness, and duty to the racial
Volk. A study of the writings of the Freicorps—right-wing
paramilitary groups of ex-soldiers and officers formed in the aftermath
of WWI—explores the unconscious fears and desires of this fascist
masculinity. It shows the deep mysogyny of men who posssessed
weak, fragmented egos, whose terrors of psychic dissolution were
associated with femininization and female sexuality, and who, as a
result, embraced a cult of masculine hardness and violence as an
emotional defense mechanism.
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Now We Turn to the Anglo-Saxon Roots
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“At some future period, not very
distant as measured by centuries, the civilized races of man will
almost certainly exterminate and replace the savage races throughout
the world” (Darwin, 1871)
“the higher—the more intellectual and moral—must displace the lower and more degraded races” (Wallace, 1864)
“The Anglo-Saxon has exterminated the less developed peoples with which he has come in competition.” (Kidd, 1894)
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from T. D. Price and G. M. Feinman, Chapter 1, “Social Inequality and the Evolution of Human Social Organization”, in Pathways to Power: New Perspectives on the Emergence of Social Inequality (Springer, 2010)
In a very real sense, human society over the last 100,000 years or more
may have been characterized by a fundamental tension between relations
based on dominance, hierarchy, and kin altruism (part of our primate
heritage) and new capacities for social cognition, cultural learning,
alliance building, and cooperation, whether the latter behaviors were
learned or part of recently acquired innate tendencies (Boehm 2000,
Stone 2008: 79, Tomasello et al. 2005).
two commentaries on Victor Nell, "Cruelty’s rewards: The gratifications of perpetrators and spectators," Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2006) 29, 211–257
1. from Mika Haritos-Fatouros, “Cruelty: A dispositional or a situational behavior in man?” Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2006) 29, p.230
The basic question remains,
however: How far are aggression, violence, and cruelty in humans today
the result of predisposition factors, or biological or archetypal
processes, and how far are they the result of cognitive/emotional
processes evoked by situational factors?
2. from Albert Bandura, “A murky portrait of human cruelty,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2006) 29, p. 225
At the macrosocial level,
Nell greatly exaggerates the prevalence of human cruelty. There
exist wide intercultural differences representing both warring and
pacific societies with large intracultural variations and even rapid
transformation of warring societies into peaceful ones.
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f
f
f
(Wallace)
Racism in England: 1864 to 1894
from Hunt Hawkins, “Heart of Darkness and Racism” in Heart of Darkness: Authoritative Texts--Backgrounds, and Contexts--Criticism, Paul B. Armstrong, ed. (Norton Critical Editions) pp. 373-4
Darwin
himself concluded, in The Descent of Man: “At some future period, not
very distant as measured by centuries, the civilized races of man will
almost certainly exterminate and replace the savage races throughout
the world”. Alfred Russel Wallace ended his 1864 article by
saying “the higher—the more intellectual and moral—must displace the
lower and more degraded races”. Eduard von Hartmann in his 1869
Philosophy of the Unconscious, a book Conrad read, wrote that it wasn’t
humane to prolong "the death struggles of savages who are on the verge
of extinction. . . . The true philanthropist, if he has
comprehended the natural law of anthropological evolution, cannot avoid
desiring an acceleration of the last convulsion, and labor for that
end.” And in 1894 in Social Evolution Benjamin Kidd observed, “The Anglo-Saxon has exterminated the less developed peoples with which he has come in competition.”
English visitors to
Conrad in Kent recollected him as “not of our race”, “like a Polish
Jew”, “the conventional stage Hebrew”, “simian”, “oriental mannerisms”,
“very Oriental indeed”, “spectacularly a foreigner”, an Oriental face”,
“semi-Mongolian”, and “like a monkey”.
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Before the Southern Strategy:
the Lynching for Rape Discourse
from Jacquelyn Hall, Revolt Against Chivalry: Jesse Daniel Ames and the Women's Campaign Against Lynching (Columbia, 1993), p. 150
The imagery of lynching—in literature, poetry, music, in the minds of men—was almost inescapably erotic. . . .
Rape and rumors of rape became a kind of acceptible folk pornography in
the Bible Belt. As stories spread, the attacker became not just a
black man but a ravenous brute, the victim a beautiful, frail, young
virgin. The experience and condition of the women. . . were
described in minute and progressively embellished detail: a public
fantasy that implies a kind of group participation in the rape of the
woman almost as cathartic as the subsequent lynching of the alleged
attacker. . . .
The small percentage of lynchings that revolved around charges of
sexual assault gripped the southern imagination far out of proportion
to statistical reality. In such scenes, described in the popular
press in strikingly conventionalized words and phrases, the themes of
masculinity, rage, and sexual envy were woven into a ritual of death
and desire.
from Lillian Smith, Killers of the Dream (1949. Norton ed. 1994)
. . . the lynched Negro becomes not an object that must die but a
receptacle for every man’s damned-up hate, and a receptacle for every
man’s forbidden feelings. Sex and hate, cohabiting in the darkness of
minds too long, pour out their progeny of cruelty on anything that can
serve as a symbol of an unnamed relationship that in his heart each man
wants to befoul. That, sometimes, the lynchers do cut off genitals of
the lynched and divide them into bits to be distributed to participants
as souvenirs is no more than a coda to this composition of hate and
guilt and sex and fear, created by our way of life. 162-3
In the name of sacred womanhood, of purity, of preserving the home,
lecherous old men and young ones, reeeking with impurities, who had
violated the home since they were sixteen yers old, whipped up
lynchings, organized Klans, burned crosses, aroused the poor and
ignorant to wild excitement by an obscene, perverse imagery describing
the “menace” of Negro men hiding behind every cypress waiting to rape
“our” women 145
Two chapters from Pieter Spierenburg, ed., Men and Violence: Gender, Honor, and Rituals in Modern Europe and America, (Ohio State U. Press, 1998):
Amy Louise Wood, Lynching and Spectacle: Witnessing Racial Violence in America, 1890-1940 (University of North Carolina Press, 2009)
W. Fitzhugh Brundage, Lynchings in the New South: Georgia and Virginia, 1880-1930 (University of Illinois Press, 1993)
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d
The Southern Strategy: the Lacan-Atwater Signifying Chain
from
Wikipedia:
(Lee
Atwater's Infamous 1981 Interview on the Southern Strategy)
As a member of the
Reagan administration in 1981, Atwater gave an
anonymous interview to political scientist Alexander P. Lamis. Part of
the interview was printed in Lamis's book The Two-Party South, then
reprinted in Southern Politics in the 1990s with Atwater's name
revealed. . . . Atwater talked about the Republican Southern Strategy
and Ronald Reagan's version of it:
Atwater:
As to the whole Southern strategy that Harry S. Dent, Sr. and others
put together in 1968, opposition to the Voting Rights Act would have
been a central part of keeping the South. Now you don't have to do
that. All you have to do to keep the South is for Reagan to run in
place on the issues he's campaigned on since 1964 and that's fiscal
conservatism, balancing the budget, cut taxes, you know, the whole
cluster.
Questioner:
But the fact is, isn't it, that Reagan does get to the Wallace voter
and to the racist side of the Wallace voter by doing away with legal
services, by cutting down on food stamps?
Atwater:
You start out in 1954 by saying, "Nigger, nigger, nigger." By 1968 you
can't say "nigger"—that hurts you. Backfires. So you say stuff like
forced busing, states' rights and all that stuff. You're getting so
abstract now [that] you're talking about cutting taxes, and all these
things you're talking about are totally economic things and a by-product
of them is [that] blacks get hurt worse than whites. And subconsciously
maybe that is part of it. I'm not saying that. But I'm saying that if
it is getting that abstract, and that coded, that we are doing away
with the racial problem one way or the other. You follow me—because
obviously sitting around saying, "We want to cut this," is much more
abstract than even the busing thing, and a hell of a lot more abstract
than "Nigger, nigger."
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after the Southern strategy:
"He's not hurting the people he needs to be hurting"
Donald Trump says:
“When Mexico sends its
people, they’re not sending their best. They’re not sending you.
They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that have lots of
problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing
drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are
good people.”
a
Trump voter in the Florida panhandle says: (from "It’s Just Too Much: A
Florida Town Grapples With a Shutdown After a Hurricane," New York Times, 1-7-19.)
I voted for
him, and he’s the one who’s doing this,” an employee of the Federal
prison in the Florida Panhandle said. “I thought he was going to do
good things. He’s not hurting the people he needs to be hurting.
Friedrich Nietzsche says: (from The Geneology of Morals, II, 14)
Here the
works of vengefulness and rancor swarm; here the air stinks of secrets
and concealment; . . . and what mendaciousness is employed to
disguise that this hatred is hatred! What a display of grand
words and postures, what an art of "honest" calumny!
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d
Fascism in Flint, Ford, and Packard
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Among the great work sites of American Industry,
the Rouge did have a fascist odor about it
The first paragraph is a description of the politics of patrimonialism.
The second
paragraph is an account of patrimonialism as a form of life.
Lichtenstein's use of the expression "fascist odor," however, forces us
to clarify what we mean by "fascism" and "fascist." In this
regard consider Weitz, Paxton and Lachmann
Richard Lachmann, "Coda: American Patrimonialism: The Return of the Repressed” in Patrimonial Power in the Modern World, Julia Adams and Mounira M. Charrad, eds. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2011:
Patrimonialism,
until fairly recently, seemed an archaic social form, largely replaced
by bureaucratic rationalism. That confident view of modernity, in the
histories that Max Weber and his followers wrote, deserves to be
challenged as patrimonial regimes reappear in states and firms
throughout the world.
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Fascism at the Rouge, circa 1941
from Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit:
Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor (Basic Books, 1995), p. 82
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Fascism in Flint, 1937

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the KKK in Packard, circa 1942
In the matter of . . .
Preferment
of Charges against Frank Buehrle by Kurt
Murdock,
President of PACKARD LOCAL U.A.W.-C.I.O. #190, held at the
local Headquarters of the Local at 6100 Mt. Elliott Avenue, in the
City of Detroit, Michigan. April 3rd, 1942, at 7:30 P.M.
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Trump and Fascism: contemporary journalism
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Fascism Reconsidered: Texts as Contexts
from Nietzsche, The Geneology of Morals, II, 16:
Let us add at once that . .
. the existence on earth of an animal soul turned against itself,
taking sides against itself, was something so new, profound, unheard
of, enigmatic, contradictory, and pregnant with a future that the
aspect of the earth was essentially altered. Indeed, divine
spectators were needed to justice to the spectacle that thus began and
the end of which is not yet in sight . . . . From now on, man . .
. gives rise to an interest, a tension, a hope, almost a certainty, as
if with him somethin were anouncing and preparing itself, as if man
were not a goal but onl a way, an episode, a bridge, a great promise.
from Michael André Bernstein, Bitter Carnival : ressentiment and the abject hero (Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 28
. . . ressentiment is
trapped forever in the slights of the past. . . . . What
“empowers” someone afflicted by ressentiment is the intensely focused,
but impotent hatred with which he feeds his sense of having been
treated unfairly, and his hope of someday forcing others to suffer in
his place.
from Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Notes from Underground, p. 96-7
Now let’s see how
things are with people who are capable of revenge . . . When the
desire for revenge takes possession of them, they are drained for a
time of every other feeling but this desire for revenge. . . . .
Now let’s look at this mouse in action. Let’s assume it has been
humiliated (it is constantly being humiliated) and that it wishes to
avenge itself. . . . The nauseating, despicable, petty desire to
repay the offender in kind may squeak more disgustingly in the mouse
than in the natural man who, because of his innate stupidity, considers
revenge as merely justice . . . . In its repulsive, evil-smelling
nest, the downtrodden, ridiculed mouse plunges immediately into a cold,
poisonous, and—most important—never-ending hatred. For forty
years, it will remember the humiliation in all its ignominious details
. . .
from Nietzsche, The Geneology of Morals, II, 22:
Oh this insane, pathetic
beast--man! What ideas he has, what unnaturalness, what paroxysms
of nonsense, what bestiality of thought erupts . . .
All this is interesting, to excess, but also of a gloomy, black,
unnerving sadness, so that one must forcibly forbid oneself to gaze too
long into these abysses. Here is sickness, beyond any doubt, the
most terrible sickness that has ever raged in man . . . . There
is so much man that is hideous!--Too long, the earth has been a
madhouse!
from Timothy R. Pauketat, An Archaeology of the Cosmos: Rethinking Agency and Religion in Ancient America (Routledge, 2012), p. 30
Indeed,
this is the very basis of
the Western world, with religions that profess beliefs while
simultaneously disciplining bodies and purging them of their desires.
Lyndal Roper on Q-Anon: Lyndal Roper, Witch Craze: Terror and Fantasy in Baroque Germany (Yale, 2004):
The hatred and terror that drove people to such
violence were shaped by social tensions and religious beliefs, but the
passions themselves derived from deeply rooted fantasies, extravagent
in their evocation of demonic lovers and Satanic revels. These
fantasies shared, for the most part, a standard structure and a similar set of primary themes. p. 7
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the cognitive shortcomings of liberalism
The excerpt at the right is from a study of Rush Limbaugh and the
Conservative Media Establishment by Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Joseph N. Cappella, both whom are at the Annenberg School for Communication, a major institutional element that is part of the liberal media establishment*. Its failure
to note the obvious--the sado-sexual performativity of Rush
Limbaugh--is one of the most striking characteristics of contemporary
two-party (liberal) discursive performativity. The vulgarity and
sadism of Limbaugh's
rhetoric is the main event in this theater of ressentiment, while the
"issues" are merely the occasion for the expression of emotionally
appealing sexual inuendo and sadism. Hall and Cappella just don't get it.
Maureen
Dowd does get it. Her pithy summary of the sado-sexual character
of the GOP's impeachment of President Clinton in 1998 should be
compared to the bemused perplexity of Jamieson and Cappella.
Katherine Stewart also gets it.
*Liberal
establishment is a term that
requires elaboration. It is the antithesis of New Deal
progressivism
in three fundamental ways. First, the genetic ontology of
progressivism is
bildung and the will to power (civic republicanism); The genetic
ontology of liberalism is
nihilism (commercial republicanism: consumerism). Second, the
nation is the primary ontology--not interests groups or victims.
Third, planning is an integral part of progressive nationalism.
Today's liberalism is referred to as the left, thus covering
over the genetic-ontological transformation of the post-war years (see
Hall et. al.)
Oelwein, Iowa - Western Campaign Trip - Informal remarks (speech file 935), October 9, 1936
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania - Campaign Address (speech file 930), October 1, 1936
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The Freud-Jamieson Black Hole of Liberalism
from Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Joseph N. Cappella, Echo Chamber: Rush
Limbaugh and the Conservative Media Establishment (Oxford Univeristy
Press, 2008), p.p. 188-89. (Emphasis added.)
Limbaugh's attempts at gender-based "humor" are of the
locker room variety. As the California gubernatorial recall was
heating up, Limbaugh informed his folowers that Lieutenant Governor Cruz
Bustamante--"whose name loosely translates into Spanish for 'large
breasts'--leads the Terminator by a few pionts" (August 18,
2003). A photomontage on the Limbaugh website shows a photograph
of Schwartzenegger's head and shoulders from his Pumping Iron days as a
body builder. A naked woman has been transposed onto his
shoulders. Over her breasts is a sign reading BUSTAMONTE.
When Madonna endorsed General Wesley Clark, Limbaugh reported that she
had "opened herself" to him. Why the vulgarity in this message
does not alienate the churchgoing conservatives in his audiences is a
question for which we have no ready answer.
from Friedrich Nietzsche, The Geneology of Morals, II, 14
Here the
works of vengefulness and rancor swarm; here the air stinks of secrets
and concealment; . . . and what mendaciousness is employed to
disguise that this hatred is hatred! What a display of grand
words and postures, what an art of "honest" calumny!
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from Maureen Dowd, "Starr Chamber: The Sequel. President Trump reaches deep into the perv barrel for his defense team," NYT, Jan 18, 2020.
The Starr chamber was a
shameful period of American history, with the prissy Puritan
independent counsel hounding and virtually jailing Monica Lewinsky and
producing hundreds of pages of panting, bodice-ripping prose that read
more like bad erotica than a federal report, rife with lurid passages
about breasts, stains and genitalia. Like the Rev. Arthur Dimmesdale
and other Pharisaic Holy Rollers before him, the prosecutor who read
the Bible and sang hymns when he jogged became fixated on sex in an
unhealthy, warped way.
Starr, who once clutched his pearls over Bill Clinton’s sexual high
jinks, is now going to bat for President “Access Hollywood.” After
playing an avenging Javert about foreplay in the Oval, Starr will now
do his utmost to prove that a real abuse of power undermining Congress
and American foreign policy is piffle.
In 2007, he defended Jeffrey Epstein. By 2016, Starr was being ousted
as president of Baptist Baylor University for failing to protect women
and looking the other way when football players were accused and
sometimes convicted of sexual assaults.
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from "Why Trump Reigns as King Cyrus: The Christian right doesn’t like the president only for his judges. They like his style."
By Katherine Stewart, New York Times, Dec. 31, 2018
A lot of attention has been
paid to the supposed paradox of evangelicals backing such an imperfect
man, but the real problem is that our idea of Christian nationalism
hasn’t caught up with the reality. We still buy the line that the hard
core of the Christian right is just an interest group working to
protect its values. But what we don’t get is that Mr. Trump’s
supposedly anti-Christian attributes and anti-democratic attributes are
a vital part of his attraction.
I have attended dozens of Christian nationalist conferences and events
over the past two years. And while I have heard plenty of comments
casting doubt on the more questionable aspects of Mr. Trump’s
character, the gist of the proceedings almost always comes down to the
belief that he is a miracle sent straight from heaven to bring the
nation back to the Lord. I have also learned that resistance to Mr.
Trump is tantamount to resistance to God.
This isn’t the religious right we thought we knew. The Christian
nationalist movement today is authoritarian, paranoid and patriarchal
at its core.
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on the hermeneutics of "intelligent design"
excerpts
from MEMORANDUM OPINION, Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005); John E. Jones III,
United States District Judge of the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Pennsylvania (also Wikipedia article on the Dover Area School District).
1. An Objective Observer Would Know that ID and Teaching About "Gaps"
and "Problems" in Evolutionary Theory are Creationist, Religious
Strategies that Evolved from Earlier Forms of Creationism
The history of the intelligent design movement (hereinafter "IDM") and
the development of the strategy to weaken education of evolution by
focusing students on alleged gaps in the theory of evolution is the
historical and cultural background against which the Dover School Board
acted in adopting the challenged ID Policy. As a reasonable observer,
whether adult or child, would be aware of this social context in which
the ID Policy arose, and such context will help to reveal the meaning
of Defendants' actions, it is necessary to trace the history of the IDM.
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Eli Zaretsky, "The Mass Psychology of Trumpism"
(18 September 2018 LRB)
Part 1 of 3
Since the
Republican primaries of 2015-16, some people have turned to psychiatry
in an effort to locate the irrational wellsprings of Trump’s victory,
but so far little progress has been made. This is because most of the
effort has gone into analysing Trump, who is often described as
suffering from ‘narcissistic personality disorder’. Not only are such
diagnoses, made from a distance, implausible; they also fail to address
a more important question: the nature of Trump’s appeal. Constituting
something close to a third of the electorate, his followers form an
intensely loyal and, psychologically, tight-knit band. They are
impervious to liberal or progressive criticisms of Trump or his
policies. On the contrary, their loyalty thrives on anti-Trump
arguments, and digs in deeper.
There is an older body
of psychological thought, however, that illuminates the kind of tight
bond Trump has forged with a significant minority of Americans.
Inspired by Freud, this thought arose following the rise of fascism and
Nazism in Europe, when Americans, too, had become wary of authoritarian
elements in their society. Southern politics had been rife with
race-baiting demagogues like Mississippi’s Theodore Bilbo since the
1890s, and the popularity of the pro-Mussolini radio priest, Father
Coughlin, demonstrated the appeal of an authoritarian message to the
immigrant North.
At the highpoint of the
New Deal, it was widely understood that legitimate economic grievances
needed to be addressed. But there was something more, which manifested
itself in intense loyalty to agitators and demagogues like Coughlin. To
understand that devotion, Frankfurt School refugees from Hitler –
including Leo Löwenthal and Theodor Adorno – drew on a
Freudian-inspired ‘mass psychology’ to analyze anti-Semites and
demagogues in the US.
Their crucial innovation
was the discovery of the special form that authoritarianism takes in
democratic societies. Previously, the agitator had been thought of as a
kind of hypnotist, while the crowd that responded to him was credulous
and childlike. Open to rumor and fear, it demanded strength and even
violence from its leaders. As the 19th-century French psychologist
Gustave Le Bon put it, the crowd ‘wants to be ruled and oppressed and
to fear its masters’. Freud had this model of crowd psychology in mind
when he wrote that
the
members of a group stand in need of the illusion that they are equally
and justly loved by their leader; but the leader himself need love no
one else, he [must] be of a masterful nature, absolutely narcissistic,
self-confident and independent.
Hitler, Mussolini, Ataturk and even De Gaulle fit this model, as they
drew on mass media, parades, sporting events and film to project
themselves as father figures to enthralled nations.
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Part 2 of 3
Adorno
realised, however, that the model only applied in part to American
demagogues. What distinguishes the demagogue in a democratic society,
he argued in ‘Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda’
(1951), is the identification between the leader and his followers. The
narcissism in question is not only Trump’s. More important is that of
his followers, who idealize him as they once, in childhood, idealized
themselves. Beyond that, the demagogue has a special appeal to wounded
narcissism, to the feeling that one has failed to meet standards one
has set for oneself.
The successful demagogue
activates this feeling by possessing the typical qualities of the
individuals who follow him, but in what Adorno, quoting Freud, called a
‘clearly marked and pure form’ that gives the impression ‘of greater
force and of more freedom of libido’. •In Adorno’s words, ‘the superman
has to resemble the follower and appear as his “enlargement”.’ The
leader ‘completes’ the follower’s self-image. This helps explain the
phenomenon of the ‘great little man’, the ‘Aw shucks’, ‘just folks’
demagogue like Huey Long. He ‘seems to be the enlargement of the
subject’s own personality, a collective projection of himself, rather
than an image of the father’ – a Trump, in other words, rather than a
Washington or Roosevelt.
One might object that
Trump, a billionaire TV star, does not resemble his followers. But this
misses the powerful intimacy that he establishes with them, at rallies,
on TV and on Twitter. Part of his malicious genius lies in his ability
to forge a bond with people who are otherwise excluded from the world
to which he belongs. Even as he cast Hillary Clinton as the tool of
international finance, he said:
I
do deals – big deals – all the time. I know and work with all the
toughest operators in the world of high-stakes global finance. These
are hard-driving, vicious cut-throat financial killers, the kind of
people who leave blood all over the boardroom table and fight to the
bitter end to gain maximum advantage.
With these words he
brought his followers into the boardroom with him and encouraged them
to take part in a shared, cynical exposure of the soiled motives and
practices that lie behind wealth. His role in the Birther movement, the
prelude to his successful presidential campaign, was not only racist,
but also showed that he was at home with the most ignorant, benighted,
prejudiced people in America. Who else but a complete loser would
engage in Birtherism, so far from the Hollywood, Silicon Valley and
Harvard aura that elevated Obama, but also distanced him from the
masses?
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Part 3 of 3
The
consistent derogation of Trump in the New York Times or on MSNBC may be
helpful in keeping the resistance fired up, but it is counterproductive
when it comes to breaking down the Trump coalition. His followers take
every attack on their leader as an attack on them. ‘The fascist
leader’s startling symptoms of inferiority’, Adorno wrote, ‘his
resemblance to ham actors and asocial psychopaths’, facilitates the
identification, which is the basis of the ideal. On the Access
Hollywood tape, which was widely assumed would finish him, Trump was
giving voice to a common enough daydream, but with ‘greater force’ and
greater ‘freedom of libido’ than his followers allow themselves. And he
was bolstering the narcissism of the women who support him, too, by
describing himself as helpless in the grip of his desires for them.
Adorno also observed
that demagoguery of this sort is a profession, a livelihood with
well-tested methods. Trump is a far more familiar figure than may at
first appear. The demagogue’s appeals, Adorno wrote, ‘have been
standardized, similarly to the advertising slogans which proved to be
most valuable in the promotion of business’. Trump’s background in
salesmanship and reality TV prepared him perfectly for his present
role. According to Adorno,
the
leader can guess the psychological wants and needs of those susceptible
to his propaganda because he resembles them psychologically, and is
distinguished from them by a capacity to express without inhibitions
what is latent in them, rather than by any intrinsic superiority.
To meet the unconscious wishes of his audience, the leader
simply
turns his own unconscious outward ... Experience has taught him
consciously to exploit this faculty, to make rational use of his
irrationality, similarly to the actor, or a certain type of journalist
who knows how to sell their ... sensitivity.
All he has to do in
order to make the sale, to get his TV audience to click, or to arouse a
campaign rally, is exploit his own psychology.
Using old-fashioned but still illuminating language, Adorno continued:
The leaders are
generally oral character types, with a compulsion to speak incessantly
and to befool the others. The famous spell they exercise over their
followers seems largely to depend on their orality: language itself,
devoid of its rational significance, functions in a magical way and
furthers those archaic regressions which reduce individuals to members
of crowds.
Since uninhibited
associative speech presupposes at least a temporary lack of ego
control, it can indicate weakness as well as strength. The agitators’
boasting is frequently accompanied by hints of weakness, often merged
with claims of strength. This was particularly striking, Adorno wrote,
when the agitator begged for monetary contributions. As with the
Birther movement or Access Hollywood, Trump’s self-debasement –
pretending to sell steaks on the campaign trail – forges a bond that
secures his idealised status.
Since 8 November 2016,
many people have concluded that what they understandably view as a
catastrophe was the result of the neglect by neoliberal elites of the
white working class, simply put. Inspired by Bernie Sanders, they
believe that the Democratic Party has to reorient its politics from the
idea that ‘a few get rich first’ to protection for the least
advantaged. Yet no one who lived through the civil rights and feminist
rebellions of recent decades can believe that an economic programme per
se is a sufficient basis for a Democratic-led politics. This holds as
well when it comes to trying to reach out to Trump’s supporters. Of
those providing his roughly 40 per cent approval ratings, half say they
‘strongly approve’ and are probably lost to the Democrats. But if we
understand the personal level at which pro-Trump strivings operate, we
may better appeal to the other half, and in that way forestall the
coming emergency.
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