Philosophy and History

"The computer and the Internet are the most recent techniques for organizing human thought in a long series of techniques and technologies, beginning with speech, for communicating, storing, retrieving, organizing, and processing information.  The series includes spoken language, pictures, tallies, clay tokens, picture writing, logographic (pictographic or ideographic) writing, syllabaries, the alphabet, abstract numbers, numerals, mathematical sigs (+, −, ×, =), the concept of zero, geometry, mathematics, logic, abstract science, maps, graphs, charts, libraries, the printing press, encyclopedia, dictionaries, bookkeeping techniques, the scientific method, photography, the telegraph, the telephone, cinema, radio, audio recording, television, video recording, optical disks, computers, control theory, cyberntics, and the Internet.

"Computing and the Internet, however, are more than just new technologies.  They represent new forms of language, if we accept that language is defined as a system for both communications and informatics.  Computing and the Internet, which encompasses the World Wide Web, are part of an evolutionary chain of languages, which also incudes speech, writing, mathematics, and science."

Robert K. Logan, The Extended Mind: The Emergence of Language, the Human Mind, and Culture (University of Toronto Press, 2007)



1. complexity

2. being/anti-being
3. transcendental empiricism
4. mind


"A remarkable burst of creativity in science is transforming traditional disciplines at an extraordinary rate, catalyzing movements whereby old boundaries are dissolving and newly integrated territories are being defined.  The new vision comes from the world of complexity, chaos, and emergent order.  This started in physics and mathematics  but is now moving rapidly into the life sciences, where it is revealing new signatures of the creative process that underlie the evolution of organisms.  A distinctive sign of life is the emergence of new order out of the complexities of its material foundations.  The concept of emergence, once regarded by many biologists as a vague and mystical concept with dangerous vitalist connotations, is now the central focus of the sciences of complexity.  Here the question is, How can systems made up of components whose properties we understand well give rise to phenomena that are quite unexpected?  Life is the most dramatic manifestation of this process, the domian of emergence par excellence.  But the new sciences united biology with physics in a manner that allows us to see the creative fabric of natural process as a single dynamic unfolding."

Ricard V. Solé, Signs of life: how complexity pervades biology Brian Goodwin Preface, ix-x Basic Books (January 2002)

"What do complex systems have to be so that they can know their worlds?" By "know" I don't mean to imply consciousness; but a complex system like the E. coli bacterium clearly knows its world. It exchanges molecular variables with its world, and swims upstream in a glucose gradient. In some sense, it has an internal representation of that world."
Stuart Kaufman, "Order for Free"

  http://www.edge.org/documents/ThirdCulture/zd-Ch.20.html
hartley
Hartley

The problem of intellectual “progress” throughout the eighteenth century appears in this light.  Perhaps no other century is so permeated with the idea of intellectual progress as that of the Enlightenment.  But we mistake the essense of this conception, if we understand it merely in a quantitative sense as an extension of knowledge indefinitely.  A qualitative determination always accompanies quantitative expansion; and an increasingly pronounced return to the characteristic center of knowledge corresponds to the extension of inquiry beyond the periphery of knowledge.  One seeks multiplicity in order to be sure of unity; one acepts the breadth of knowledge in the sure anticipation that this breadth does not impede the intellect, but that, on the contrary, it leads the intellect back to, and concetrates it in, itself.  For we see again and again that the divergence of the paths followed by the intellect in its attempt to encompass all of reality is merely apparent.  If these paths viewed objectively seem to diverge, their divergence is, nevertheless, no mere dispersion.  All the various energies of the mind are, rather, held together in a common center of force.  Variety and diversity of shapes are simply the full unfolding of an essentially homogeneous formative power.  When the eighteenth century wants to characterize this power in a single word, it calls it “reason.”

Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of  the Enlightenment

ernstfrom Wikipedia:
"Cassirer was both a genuine philosopher and an historian of philosophy. His major work, Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (3 vols., 1923–1929) is considered a benchmark for a philosophy of culture. Man, says Cassirer later in his more popular Essay on Man (1944), is a "symbolic animal". Whereas animals perceive their world by instincts and direct sensory perception, man has created his own universe of symbolic meaning that structures and shapes his perception of reality - and only thus, for instance, can conceive of utopias and therefore progress in the form of shared human culture. In this, Cassirer owes much to Kant's transcendental idealism, which claimed that the actual world cannot be known, but that the human view on reality is shaped by our means of perceiving it. For Cassirer, the human world is created through symbolic forms of thought which are linguistic, scholarly, scientific, and artistic, sharing and extending through communication, individual understanding, discovery and expression."
  The democratic idiosyncracy which opposes [the will to power] has permeated the realm of the spirit and disguised itself in the most spiritual forms to such a degree that today it has forced its way, has acquired the right to force its way into the strictest, apparently most objective sciences;  indeed, it  . . . has robbed life of a fundamental concept, that of activity.  Under the influence of the above metioned idosyncracy, one places instead "adaptation" in the foreground, that is to say,  an activity of the second rank, a mere reactivity; indeed, life itesslf has been defined as a more and more efficient inner adaptation to external conditons (Herbert Spencer).  Thus, the essence of life, its will to power, is ignored; one overlooks the essential priority of the spontaneous, aggressive, expansive, form-giving forces that give new interpretations and directions, although 'adaptation' follows only after this; the dominant role of the highest functionaries within the organism iself in which the will to life appears active and form-giving is denied.

Friederich Nietzsche, Geneology of Morals, II, 12
from Robert B. Brandom, "The Centrality of Sellars's Two-Ply Account of Observations to the Arguments of 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind', in Robert B. Brandom, Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality (Harvard University Press, 2002)

"If we strip empiricism down to its core, we might identify it with the insight that knowledge of the empirical world depends essentially on the capacity of knowing organisms to respond differentially to distinct environing stimuli." (349)

" . . . the difference that makes a difference is that candidates for observational knowledge do not just have reliable dispositions to respond differentially to stimuli by making noises, but have reliable dispositions to respond differentialy to those stimuli by applying concepts." (351)

"The observer's response is conceptually contentful just insofar as it occupies a node in a web of inferential relations."(p. 351) [see Imus]

"What the parrot lacks is a conceptual understanding of its response.  That is why it is just making noise.  Its response means nothing to the parrot--though it may mean something to us, who can make inferences from it . . . " (351)

(" . . . according to Sellars's view, the difference between theoretical objects and observable objects is methodologcal rather than ontological.  That is, theoretical and observable objects are not different kinds of things.  They differ only in how we come to know about them." (362))
from Truth and genesis : philosophy as differential ontology / Miguel de Beistegui. Indiana University Press, c2004.

The transcendental in Deleuze's sense amounts to a double twisting free, therefore: first, from transcendance, whether of God, of being, of the subject (of consciousness), or the object; second, from the problematic regarding the conditions of possibility of experience and knowledge in general, irreducibly complicit with the logic of resemblance.  Deleuze replaces the classical problematic of the transcendental as involving transcendance and possibility with that of immanence and genesis.  Transcendental empiricism is concerned with isolating the genetic and immanent conditions of existence of the real. And metaphysics is the sole instrument available for understanding what is real within the real, the only access to its inner movement, rife with novelty.

 (Truth & Genesis, 244)


But where does this leave us?  If, in moving from macroscopic objects to microscopic ones, we do not move simply in the order of size, we do not move simply toward the infinitesimally small, but in such a way that we end up calling into question our assumpitons of what makes a natural object what it is; if, in other words,  what is decisive in the discovery of the world of subatomic particles is not so much the size of the objects, but their ontological status qua objects, then we need a whole set of new concepts in order to describe them.

 (Truth & Genesis, 202)

 . . .  contemporary physics, particularly in relation to quantum theory and thermodynamics,  enacts a twisting free of the metaphysics of substance and subject inherited from classical ontology . . . Where metaphysics thought essenses, contemporary physics thinks events.  Where metaphysics thought permanence, contemporary physics thinks evolution.  Where metaphysics thought substances as self-identical substrata onto which accidents were added, from the outside as it were, physics celebrates the reversibility of substance and accidents, and thus the end of substantialism.  In this context "thinking" means thinking by way of mathematics: movement, contingency, chance, chaos are concepts that are no longer simply ontological, no longer simply integrated within a pre-mathematical physics, but entirely and completely mathematical.

 (Truth & Genesis, 189)



the problem of class: the givenness of any classificatory scheme cannot be made to yield socio-political causation.  The {working class} in itself does not become the {working class} for itself.  The in-itself is taken as theatrical context and lifeworld, not as essential being.  And humans are seen not as {persons} but as complex organisms contextually parameterized.

Being itself is seen as a provisional emergent out of the flux of forces and fields, contextually parameterized.

For example, in construing the Keynesian Elite; the shopfloor; the the psychological experience of hierarchy (Art Lamb interview)

Being and the play of forces: a dialectical double helix
Being and Praxis

Being as an effect of discourse
Being as an uncertain and provisional emergent
Cassirer, Nietzsche and Sellars: why they hang together
active force is minding, rooted in life itself

Nancey Murphy and William R. Stoeger, eds., Evolution And Emergence: Systems, Organisms, Persons (Oxford University Press, 2007)


Philosophy as empirical/research tool

Seeing--patterns, details, expression, etc.--is an active process, the diference that makes a difference.  
right


Wilfred Sellars  Papers, California State University, Fresno Web page | Philosophy Department Web Page | Fresno State news|

Symbolical forms and their role in an anthropological analysis. Ernst Cassirer’s conception of the human world
Book Series    Analecta Husserliana
Volume    Volume 94
Book    Phenomenology of Life from the Animal Soul to the Human Mind
Publisher    Springer Netherlands
DOI    10.1007/978-1-4020-5182-1
Copyright    2007
ISBN    978-1-4020-5181-4 (Print) 978-1-4020-5182-1 (Online)
Part    Part 6
DOI    10.1007/978-1-4020-5182-1_31
Pages    523-531
Subject Collection    Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
SpringerLink Date    Tuesday, August 14, 2007

The roots of theatre: rethinking ritual and other theories of origin By Eli Rozik

The Anthropology of experience By Victor Witter Turner, Edward M. Bruner

Introducing anthropology of religion: culture to the ultimate By Jack David Eller