Philosophy and History
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"The computer and the Internet are the most recent techniques for organizing human thought in a long series of techniques and technologies, beginning with speech, for communicating, storing, retrieving, organizing, and processing information. The series includes spoken language, pictures, tallies, clay tokens, picture writing, logographic (pictographic or ideographic) writing, syllabaries, the alphabet, abstract numbers, numerals, mathematical sigs (+, −, ×, =), the concept of zero, geometry, mathematics, logic, abstract science, maps, graphs, charts, libraries, the printing press, encyclopedia, dictionaries, bookkeeping techniques, the scientific method, photography, the telegraph, the telephone, cinema, radio, audio recording, television, video recording, optical disks, computers, control theory, cyberntics, and the Internet. "Computing and the Internet, however, are more than just new technologies. They represent new forms of language, if we accept that language is defined as a system for both communications and informatics. Computing and the Internet, which encompasses the World Wide Web, are part of an evolutionary chain of languages, which also incudes speech, writing, mathematics, and science." Robert K. Logan, The Extended Mind: The Emergence of Language, the Human Mind, and Culture (University of Toronto Press, 2007) |
1. complexity 2. being/anti-being 3. transcendental empiricism 4. mind |
"A remarkable
burst of creativity in science is transforming traditional disciplines
at an extraordinary rate, catalyzing movements whereby old boundaries
are dissolving and newly integrated territories are being
defined. The new vision comes from the world of complexity,
chaos, and emergent order. This started in physics and
mathematics but is now moving rapidly into the life sciences,
where it is revealing new signatures of the creative process that
underlie the evolution of organisms. A distinctive sign of
life is the emergence of new order out of the complexities of its
material foundations. The concept of emergence, once regarded
by many biologists as a vague and mystical concept with dangerous
vitalist connotations, is now the central focus of the sciences of
complexity. Here the question is, How can systems made up of
components whose properties we understand well give rise to phenomena
that are quite unexpected? Life is the most dramatic
manifestation of this process, the domian of emergence par
excellence. But the new sciences united biology with physics
in a manner that allows us to see the creative fabric of natural process as
a single dynamic unfolding."
Ricard V. Solé, Signs of life: how complexity pervades biology Brian Goodwin Preface, ix-x Basic Books (January 2002) |
"What do complex systems have to be so that they can know their
worlds?" By "know" I don't mean to imply consciousness; but a complex
system like the E. coli bacterium clearly knows its world. It exchanges
molecular variables with its world, and swims upstream in a glucose
gradient. In some sense, it has an internal representation of that
world."
http://www.edge.org/documents/ThirdCulture/zd-Ch.20.htmlStuart Kaufman, "Order for Free" |
![]() Hartley
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The problem of intellectual
“progress” throughout the eighteenth century appears in
this light. Perhaps no other century is so permeated with the
idea of intellectual progress as that of the Enlightenment. But
we mistake the essense of this conception, if we understand it merely
in a quantitative sense as an extension of knowledge
indefinitely. A qualitative determination always accompanies
quantitative expansion; and an increasingly pronounced return to the
characteristic center of knowledge corresponds to the extension of
inquiry beyond the periphery of knowledge. One seeks multiplicity
in order to be sure of unity; one acepts the breadth of knowledge in
the sure anticipation that this breadth does not impede the intellect,
but that, on the contrary, it leads the intellect back to, and
concetrates it in, itself. For we see again and again that the
divergence of the paths followed by the intellect in its attempt to
encompass all of reality is merely apparent. If these paths
viewed objectively seem to diverge, their divergence is, nevertheless,
no mere dispersion. All the various energies of the mind are,
rather, held together in a common center of force. Variety and
diversity of shapes are simply the full unfolding of an essentially
homogeneous formative power. When the eighteenth century wants to
characterize this power in a single word, it calls it
“reason.”
Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment
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from Wikipedia:"Cassirer was both a genuine philosopher and an historian of philosophy. His major
work, Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (3 vols., 1923–1929) is
considered a benchmark for a philosophy of culture. Man, says Cassirer
later in his more popular Essay on Man (1944), is a "symbolic animal".
Whereas animals perceive their world by instincts and direct sensory
perception, man has created his own universe of symbolic meaning that
structures and shapes his perception of reality - and only thus, for
instance, can conceive of utopias and therefore progress in the form of
shared human culture. In this, Cassirer owes much to Kant's
transcendental idealism, which claimed that the actual world cannot be
known, but that the human view on reality is shaped by our means of
perceiving it. For Cassirer, the human world is created through
symbolic forms of thought which are linguistic, scholarly, scientific,
and artistic, sharing and extending through communication, individual
understanding, discovery and expression."
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| The democratic idiosyncracy which opposes [the will to
power] has permeated the realm of the spirit and disguised itself in
the most spiritual forms to such a degree that today it has forced its
way, has acquired the right
to force its way into the strictest, apparently most objective
sciences; indeed, it . . . has robbed life of a
fundamental
concept, that of activity.
Under the influence of the above metioned idosyncracy, one
places
instead "adaptation" in the foreground, that is to say, an
activity of the second rank, a mere reactivity; indeed, life itesslf
has been defined as a more and more efficient inner adaptation to
external conditons (Herbert Spencer). Thus, the essence of
life,
its will to power, is ignored; one overlooks the essential priority of
the spontaneous, aggressive, expansive, form-giving forces that give
new interpretations and directions, although 'adaptation' follows only
after this; the dominant role of the highest functionaries within the
organism iself in which the will to life appears active and
form-giving is denied. Friederich
Nietzsche, Geneology
of Morals, II, 12
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from Robert B.
Brandom, "The Centrality of Sellars's Two-Ply
Account of Observations to the Arguments of 'Empiricism and the
Philosophy of Mind', in Robert B. Brandom, Tales of the Mighty Dead:
Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality
(Harvard
University Press, 2002) "If we strip empiricism down to its core, we might identify it with the insight that knowledge of the empirical world depends essentially on the capacity of knowing organisms to respond differentially to distinct environing stimuli." (349) " . . . the difference that makes a difference is that candidates for observational knowledge do not just have reliable dispositions to respond differentially to stimuli by making noises, but have reliable dispositions to respond differentialy to those stimuli by applying concepts." (351) "The observer's response is conceptually contentful just insofar as it occupies a node in a web of inferential relations."(p. 351) [see Imus] "What the parrot lacks is a conceptual understanding of its response. That is why it is just making noise. Its response means nothing to the parrot--though it may mean something to us, who can make inferences from it . . . " (351) (" . . . according to Sellars's view, the difference between theoretical objects and observable objects is methodologcal rather than ontological. That is, theoretical and observable objects are not different kinds of things. They differ only in how we come to know about them." (362)) |
| from Truth and genesis : philosophy as differential ontology / Miguel de Beistegui. Indiana University Press, c2004. The transcendental in Deleuze's sense amounts to a double twisting free, therefore: first, from transcendance, whether of God, of being, of the subject (of consciousness), or the object; second, from the problematic regarding the conditions of possibility of experience and knowledge in general, irreducibly complicit with the logic of resemblance. Deleuze replaces the classical problematic of the transcendental as involving transcendance and possibility with that of immanence and genesis. Transcendental empiricism is concerned with isolating the genetic and immanent conditions of existence of the real. And metaphysics is the sole instrument available for understanding what is real within the real, the only access to its inner movement, rife with novelty. (Truth & Genesis, 244)
But where
does this leave us? If, in moving from macroscopic objects to
microscopic ones, we do not move simply in the order of size, we do not
move simply toward the infinitesimally small, but in such a way that we
end up calling into question our assumpitons of what makes a natural
object what it is; if, in other words, what is decisive in the
discovery of the world of subatomic particles is not so much the size of
the objects, but their ontological status qua objects, then we need a
whole set of new concepts in order to describe them. (Truth & Genesis, 202)
(Truth & Genesis, 189)
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the
problem of class: the givenness of any classificatory scheme cannot be
made to yield socio-political causation. The {working class} in
itself does not become the {working class} for itself. The
in-itself is taken as theatrical context and lifeworld, not as essential
being. And humans are seen not as {persons} but as complex
organisms contextually parameterized.
Being itself is seen as a provisional emergent out of the flux of forces and fields, contextually parameterized. For example, in construing the Keynesian Elite; the shopfloor; the the psychological experience of hierarchy (Art Lamb interview) Being and the play of forces: a dialectical double helix Being and Praxis Being as an effect of discourse Being as an uncertain and provisional emergent |
Cassirer, Nietzsche and Sellars: why they hang together active force is minding, rooted in life itself |
| Nancey Murphy and William R. Stoeger,
eds., Evolution And
Emergence:
Systems, Organisms, Persons (Oxford University Press, 2007) |
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| Philosophy as empirical/research tool Seeing--patterns, details, expression, etc.--is an active process, the diference that makes a difference. ![]() |
Wilfred Sellars Papers, California State University, Fresno Web page | Philosophy Department Web Page | Fresno State news| Symbolical forms and their role in an anthropological analysis. Ernst Cassirer’s conception of the human world Book Series Analecta Husserliana Volume Volume 94 Book Phenomenology of Life from the Animal Soul to the Human Mind Publisher Springer Netherlands DOI 10.1007/978-1-4020-5182-1 Copyright 2007 ISBN 978-1-4020-5181-4 (Print) 978-1-4020-5182-1 (Online) Part Part 6 DOI 10.1007/978-1-4020-5182-1_31 Pages 523-531 Subject Collection Humanities, Social Sciences and Law SpringerLink Date Tuesday, August 14, 2007 The roots of theatre: rethinking ritual and other theories of origin By Eli Rozik The Anthropology of experience By Victor Witter Turner, Edward M. Bruner Introducing anthropology of religion: culture to the ultimate By Jack David Eller |