Fascism is a concept not an epithet

Patrimonialism, Fascism
, and the Lynching for Rape Discourse
(Kant, Weber, and Foucault)

fascism
racism/
anti-semitism
patrimonialism
white supremacy
racism/
anti-semitism
white supremacy
fascism
patrimonialism
patrimonialism
fascism
white supremacy
racism/
anti-semitism
white suspremacy
patrimonialism
racism/
anti-semitism
fascism




This page is a companion to Fascism and Patrimonialism, in which historical materials are assembled, beginning with Robert O. Paxton's Anatomy of Fascism.

Here I assemble philosophical materials of critical importance if we are to make sense out of the phenomenological bundles that have been refered to variously as Fascism, Racism/Anti-Semitism, White Supremancy, and Patrimonialism.

This whole site is a critique of the Cartesian presuppositional matrix that determines the cognitive discursive performativity of MSNBC.  Relevant texts can be found in Cartesian presuppositional matrix.

Why Putin et. al.?

the Map is not the Territory

from Eckart Förster, The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy: a Systematic Reconstruction (Harvard, 2012)

 . . . concepts have their basis in functions, by which Kant understands “the unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representaton.” (A68).  A concept is a rule for combining certain representations (and thus also a principle for excluding certain others).  Thus the represesntations’white’, ‘grainy’, ‘saline’ are combined and ordered in the concept ‘salt, while the representations ‘colorless’, ‘liquid’, ‘tasteless’ (say) are not.  In this way a concept is a rule allowing me to unite certain representations and to bring them under a higher representation, i.e. the concept. (pp. 22-3)

Cognition does not consist merely in the collecting of phenomena; rather we strive to forge conceptual links between them and to grasp the laws of nature that are valid for specific classes of objects as cases of yet more general laws, whereby we are guided by the ideal of a unified explanation of nature. (p. 38)

“To make concepts out of representations one must be able to compare, to reflect, and to abstract, for these three logical operations of the understanding are the essential and universal conditions for the generation of every concept whatsoever.  I see, e.g., a spruce, a willow, and a linden.  By first comparing these objects with one another I note that they are different from one another in regard to the trunk, the btanches, the leaves, etc.; but next I reflect on that which they have in common among themselves, trunk, branches, and leaves themselves, and I abstract from the quantity, the figure, etc., of these; thus I acquire a concept of a tree.” (pp. 250-51)




"Thoughts without intuitions are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind."


"Philosophy always arrives too late . . . .  The Owl of Minerva takes flight only as the dusk begins to fall."

"Hegel remarks somewhere that all great world-historic facts and personages appear, so to speak, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce."

History without philosophy is only a screen on which to project the shibboleths of our time.

Hitler is to Trump as tragedy is to farce.




Our experience and knowledge of reality . . . is therefore embedded in a network of concepts delineating what we perceive as our environment
from Christian J. Emden, Nietzsche on Language, Consciousness, and the Body (University of Illinois Press, 2005)

Nietzsche nowhere denies that things exist.  What he denies is the idea that such things are things-in-themselves, as well as the claim that some things exist for us independently of our mental activity.  The existence of things is not the result of some unmediated perception of facts but already the product of interpretation and therefore of mental activity. (56)

In Die fröliche Wissenschaft (1882) Nietzsche proposes that language enables us to “produce” things, to shape our conception of reality:  “This has given me the greatest trouble and still does: to realize that what things are called is incomparably more important than what they are . . . it is sufficient to create new names and estimations and probabilities in order to create, in the long run, new ‘things’”. (75)

For Nietzsche, language lets us grasp, order, and judge what we regard as reality, and it also gives us the means to reflect on this reality through the development of general terms and concepts, which let us realize similarities and relations among things and see contexts and construct coherent systems of belief about this reality.  Our experience and knowledge of reality . . . is therefore embedded in a network of concepts delineating what we perceive as our environment. (75)



from Levi R. Bryant, Difference and Givenness: Deleuze's Transcendental Empiricism and the Ontology of Immanence (Northwestern University Press, 2008)

  . . . so long as philosophy assumes that thought has a natural affinity with the true . . . a specific form of objectivity (natural common sense), and bases itself on the model of recognition, thought cannot help but become unconsciously trapped in its own implicit presuppositions which are culturally, historically, and socially contingent. . . .  Deleuze thus begins with a crique of the transcendental subject as a structure consisting of invariant categories. (17)