Levi R. Bryant, Difference and Givenness: Deleuze's Transcendental Empiricism and the Ontology of Immanence (Northwestern University Press, 2008)
Preface

 . . . Deleuze's transcendental empiricism attempts to overcome the opposition between concepts and intuitions . . . that has characterized most of the history of philosophy and which arises from the assumption of a finite subject whose receptivity is conceived of as passive. (ix)

 . . . if Deleuze is able to depart from the philosophy of representation characterized by the primacy of the concept, then this is because he discovers intelligibility in the aesthetic itself, in the very fabric of the given, in the form of the differentials of perceptions.  Deleuze does not so much give us a way of mediating the relation between the universal and the particular, but dispenses with the problem altogether. (ix-x)

logic of multiplicities
Introduction

 . . . sensibility is itself the result of productive processes that actually create or produce the qualities of sensibility. (9) (Brandom)

 . . . Deleuze undermines the opposition between the universal and the particular, concepts and intuitions, the sensible and the intelligible . . . by discovering intelligibility in the givens of experience itself.  The opposition between the sensible and the intelligibile is not even operative in Deleuze's ontology. (11)

 . . . Deleuze's strategy functions to overcome the opposition between being and thinking in that thought is no longer conceived  of as a representation of being but is instead productive of being itself. (12)

Chapter 1.  Empiricism and the Search for the Conditions of Real Experience

philosophy is unable to begin insofar as it remains within the constellation of unspoken assumptions and ungrounded presuppositions. (15)

 . . . so long as philosophy assumes that thought has a natural affinity with the true . . . a specific form of objectivity (natural common sense), and bases itself on the model of recognition, thought cannot help but become unconsciously trapped in its own implicit presuppositions which are culturally, historically, and socially contingent. . . .  Deleuze thus begins with a crique of the transcendental subject as a strcture consisting of invariant categories. (17)

 . . . dogmatism posits an extra-wordly realm of essences that falsely unify the diversity of the world, while empiricism falls prey to a nominalistic atomism which treats all beings in terms of an indifferent diversity. (19)

 . . . the error will arise in that Kant treats concepts and intuitions as differing in kind [emphasisi added; see Brandom] and thus being externally related, rather tha discerning the manner in which they only differ in degree. (28)  BRANDOM

 . . . for Deleuze concepts do not subsume intuitons at all (28)

the Self: 36-7
Eigenvector (Being) 38

 . . . metaphysics and transcendental philosophy are only able to proceed by granting themselves a ready-made inndividuated being in the form of the Self or Person (in much the same way that signification finds itelf assuming a ready-made denotation), rather than an account of individuation as such. (38)

•••In accounting for real rather than all possible experience, what Deleuze is after is not an account of each individual entity, but rather a set of variations capable of defining a series or set of beings.  In short, the variations of difference must be conceived of as a unity of difference by virtue of having a common principle of production underlying the variations.  In other words, the conditions of real experience are what might be called morphological, topological or genetic essences which we find in real experience.  43

Note 2, pp. 267-8: Deleuze draws the term multiplicity from mathematics, where it is normally referred to as a manifold.  No doubt the naming of the concept "manifold" as "multiplicity" has invited confusion on the part of readers of Deleuze who are inclined to conceive Deleuzian multiplicities as diversities rather than as structures.  
Chapter 2.  Bergsonian Intuition and Internal Difference

if we are to avoid merely repeating a set of subjective presuppositions . . .  everybody knows . . .

differences

 . . . the difference between concepts and intuitions is a difference in degree rather than kind.  53

•• . . . Deleuze does not appeal to an immediate intuition shared by all of us, but rather treats intuition as a practice or method.  53

•While Deleuze's concept of intuition shares affinities with what has been called "intuition" throughout the history of philosophy, it differs in the crucial respect that it must be practiced and performed, that it requires a discipline and "training," rather than being an immediately given.  In this respect, it is much closer to phenomenological methods of analysis than traditional appeals to intuition.  53-4

•••We can think of the object as a value generated by the function, whereas the function is a style of becoming.  Where becoming conceived in terms of coming-to-be and passing away is always broader than the duration it purports to describe, the function is able to reach all the way to the individual event and continuous transformation at any moment in the history or process of its unfolding.  A morphological essence does not characterize a thing, but a possible world, a system of appearances, a way of being . .   66

••• The concrete case or real being is never the object of thought, of intuition.  What we seek in the case is not an adequate description of the case (which would very likely be impossible), but rather the style  or morphological essence that inheres throughout a series of cases. . . .  Consequently we can say that the object, the theme, the thing which the concept is identical to is not what is given in experience, but is rather the essence or style functioning as the principle of that experience or world.  67-8

••• It is not the given which is the thing, but rather the tendency, the movement, the act.  As such, the concept is not identical to the object given in experience, but rather to the tendency insofar as it functions as a style or essence of a possible world.  68

•••A style or essence is what we might refer to as an identity of difference, or an identity produced through difference.  It is not a type or a kind, but rather a rule of production, a genetic factor.  It is an identity that maintains itself through topological variations.  It is for this reason that we speak of morphological essences or diagrams of becoming.  68

•••Although Deleuze himelf never makes reference to the notion of topological essences, the theme can be seen to run throughout his work. . . .  Insofar as a topological identity is produced between the variations a structure can undergo, Deleuze is also able to maintain the being of concrete universals which are no longer opposed to particulars. 70-71



Chapter 3.  Transcendental Empiricism: The Image of Thought and the "Phenomenology" of the Encounter



If the moral image of thought, the model of recognition, represents an inadequate model of thought then it is because recognition itself fails to induce thought.  To be sure, involves all sorts of cognitions and processing; but it would be philosophically and conceptually irresponsible to simply identify thought with cognition.  Thought does not simply involve mental acts but is that which requires us to go beyond what is familiar.  To identify thought with cognition would be purely empirical and therefore nominal insofar as it would vaguely identify thought with any movement of the mind, rather than identifying the distinguishing feature which characterizes thought alone.  On the other hand, there are all sorts of different modes of cognition (imagining, wishing, sensing, remembering, fantasizing), such that simply identifying thought with recognition would amount to being unable to know where to locate thought at all.  Finally, the notion of thought seems to imply all sorts of upheavals, perplexities, and questions, while that of recognition seems to imply a passive complacency and continuity which thus sets it at odds with what we refer to as thought[emph. added]. . . .  The recognized does not provoke thought because it recognizes only itself; it recognizes only what it expects [media].  As a result, a model of thought based on recognition is doomed only to rediscover itself.  Rather, if we are to understand the nature of thought, we must seek out those events which disturb complacency and recognition, which call it into question, which perplexes and startles us.  90-91
Chapter 4.  First Moment of the Encounter: The Sentiendum  

 For this reason it is necessary

that something in the world forces us to think.  This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundametal encounter. (DR 139-40) p. 92

Transcendental empiricism is an empiricism insofar as it must rely on the force of an encounter[emph.added] to engender thought.  Here it is not the object of the encounter that is important.  The aim is not to represent the object, or to draw a sensation from the object.  Rather, the object of the encounter is the occasion of thought, but not that which is to be thought.  92--3

Rather than seeing the encounter as announcing a new domain of being to be mapped and explored, the moral of thought instead treats the encounter as a deviation from the norm . . .  94

Chapter 5.  Second Moment of the Encounter: The Memorandum

The encounter has the effect of forcing us to pose a problem.  "That which can only be sensed (the sentiendum or the being of the sensible) moves the soul, 'perplexes' it--in other words, forces it to pose a problem: as thought the object of ;encounter, the sign, were the bearer of a problem--as though it were a problem" (Diff. & Rep. 140)  It would therefore be wrong to suppose that the encounter is an encounter with a positive reality or a something.  What is important in the encounter is not the object or concrete experience, but the problem.  [emph added](102)

 . . . Deleuze begins not with the finitude of the subject, but with the open whole out of which subjects and objects are actualized. (107)

2 forms of causality (conventional vs. structural)

•• . . . how can there be synchronous language at work in unfolding speech characterized by the irreversible arrow of time.  The reason for this is that they all rely on the notion of a structural, essential, machinic, systematic, or assemblage-based causality which is static with respect to events they render possible, rather than dynamic like the causality belonging to actual entities which moves from actuality to actuality.  112

So long as we conceive of Being according to the Newtonian pardigm of actual objects all causing and effecting one another, the notion of structure, assemblage, machine, system, or essence (in the specific sense I am developing it here) becomes incomprehensible.  This is because the world of causes and effects, of actual entities does not recognize the continuity of relations, their ontological efficacy, but only the ever-shifting movements of real beings transferring force to one another.  We here encounter one of the fundamental reasons explaining why we tend to think of the world in terms of subjects or individuals and atomic objects, rather than the system of relations organizing them. [emph added] Insofar as experience is spatialized and composed of mixed composites and differences in degree, and insofar as Memory is essentially forgotten, the relations organizing and informing our experience become invisible or efface themselves.  We fail to recognize a specifically structural causality.  112-13

 . . . the past is both the past as such yet present with the present as well. 114
{“The past isn’t dead.  It isn’t even past.” – William Faulkner, 1951}
more on past p. 118

•••The difference between mechanical or efficient causality and structural causality can be expressed as a difference between horizontal and vertical forms of movement.  With efficient causality we have a sort of horizontal relation between causes in a series, such that one cause is directly related to the next and modifies the relations of all the elements involved.  The horizontal knows no preservation of the relation.  Structural causality, by contrast, functions by virtue of a sort of vertical leap forth from the structure in such a way that the relations belonging to the structure are maintained.  With respect to the actualized elements of the structure, the structure remains invariant . . . 127

We encounter here one of the crucial differences between mechanical causality and structuralist accounts of causality.  A causal account is able to predict the form that future events will take, if only in an abstract and general way.  By contrast, structural accounts do not predict what form the future configuration of events will take, but rather explain them . . . 127-8

It is always a matter of returning to the system underlying surface manifestations which function as genetic principles.  128
Chapter 6.  Third Moment of the Encounter: The Cogitandum

problems and structural essences

 . . . a point of view or a perspective is not something that belongs to a subject, but rather a subject belongs to, occupies, or is occupied by a point of view or perspective.  152

Insofar as the deadlock between realism and nominalism arises because both define themselves by reference to the empirical object, an approach beginning with problems or the idea of the problematic proves superior insofar as we tend to think the being of the problem as that which is not yet actualized, and which is thus independent of individual entities.  154

 . . . the transcendental concept of problems does not assume that the probmematicity of problems resembles their solutions, but rather that problems have an immanent organizaton of their own irreducible to any particular case of solution.  In this respect, all solutions are absolutely creative insofar as they represent novel actualizations of the problematic field.  167

••The mulitplicity of of structure is never actualized in a single being, but undergoes a series of divergent actualizations. . .  It is for this reason that Deleuze refers to structures as concrete universals or essences. . . .  If probems are universals, then this is because the solutions are variations of the complex theme or style: they are topologcal variations.  169

If problems are that which can only be thought, then this is because, for the same reason, problems are never manifested in empirical experience, but are rather that which belongs to thought as such.  They define thought in its transcendental functioning, apart from the convergence of the faculties.  Thought is the faculty of problems.  172

[Deleuze's methodology] consists in undergoing the force of an encounter which allows each faculty to be pushed to its limit, to its superior and transcendental exercise.  It is in this respect that the Deleuzian position consists in an apprenticeship or learning rather than knowing. 173

No longer is it a question of how we recognize or how we represent a world external to us, but rather it is now a question of what it means to learn, of what takes place in the force of an encounter, of how problems are actualized in solutions.  174


Chapter 7. Overcoming Speculative Dogmatism: Time and the Transcendental Field

In Kant, the critical turn revolves around the "Copernical revolution," which involves resolving to see how objects conform to mind, rather than the mind to objects. . . .   In effect, we can say that Deleuze effects a third "Copernical revolution."  175-6

Deleuzians are fond of renouncing figures like Kant or Hegel and theoretical approaches like structuralism and psychoanalysis on the basis of being state philosophies based on the primacy of lack.  What really seems to transpire here is a sort of specifically Deleuzian fanaticism born of a fundamental fantasy that would return the person to the lost primordial unity.  The joke is that this lost unity is created as a result of the very search for it.  177

For Kant, a Copernical revolution is effected in philosophy and our thought becomes critical when we cease trying to determine how mind conforms to object, and instead seek to deterine how objects conform to mind. . . .  For Deleuze . . . the Copernical revolution takes place in and through eternal return.  181-2  [Bryant here expands on eternal return]
Chapter 8. Individuation: the Genesis of Extensities and the Other-Structure

The mark of a truly critical philosophy consists in being able to anticipate, predict, and account for a set of illusions that are internal to thought itself.  To say that these illusions or errors are internal to thought itself is to claim that they are in a way constitutive of thought, that they do not arise from a failed adequation between word and thing, that they are not simply contingent, but an effect of thinking itself.  Those interested in "overcoming" the Image of thought and conceiving it as being merely contingent as an institutional imposition forced upon subjects who would otherwise be entirely free if they could just destroy this image, completely fail to recognize this nuance in Deleuze's thinking.  Overcoming the Image of thought makes this image no less inevitable, it just means that an other set of values becomes possible.  220

 . . . the Image of thought . . . is predicated on a fundamental, even primordial, decision for the smooth and reassuring world of continuity over the dark and ferocious world of the event, the encounter.  The Image of thought establishes itself on the repression and exile of the encounter, of difference, in a way that can only be called evaluative.
Conclusion

The empiricism of Hume, as Deleuze articulates it, begins not with the question of how a subject can know an object, nor with how subjects produce objects or objects produce subjects, but rather with the question of how both subjects and objects can be produced out of a field that does not assume them in advance.  It is here that we can begin to see how "superior empiricism" avoids the fallacy of empiricism.  Transcendental empiricism does not assume in advance what subjects and objects ought to be in the sense of formal essences, but instead sees them as productions out of a field of immanence where immanence is immanent to nothing save itself.  265
Wellman interview
Jim Peter's problematic
Ziggy Mize
Mich Steel Tube re. first and second gen vis a vis authority


ADD Miguel de Beistegui quote (genetic)
ADD Demetrious quote (the concept)

UAW interviews; their dialogic nature; their singularities (Wellman, Fagan, Mize)

from WIKI

According to Deleuze, the traditional image of thought, found in philosophers such as Aristotle, Descartes, and Husserl, misconceives of thinking as a mostly unproblematic business. Truth may be hard to discover—it may require a life of pure theorizing, or rigorous computation, or systematic doubt—but thinking is able, at least in principle, to correctly grasp facts, forms, ideas, etc. It may be practically impossible to attain a God's-eye, neutral point of view, but that is the ideal to approximate: a disinterested pursuit that results in a determinate, fixed truth; an orderly extension of common sense. Deleuze rejects this view as papering over the metaphysical flux, instead claiming that genuine thinking is a violent confrontation with reality, an involuntary rupture of established categories. Truth changes what we think; it alters what we think is possible. By setting aside the assumption that thinking has a natural ability to recognize the truth, Deleuze says, we attain a "thought without image", a thought always determined by problems rather than solving them.